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ABSTRACT: Media discourses have conveyed the message that European identity has been severely un-
dermined by the Euro-crisis. We test this contention with Eurobarometer data. Conceptually we distin-
guish two dimensions of collective identity: ‘image’ and ’belonging’. We surmise that economic downturns 
can alter the superficial layer of identity (image-like assessments), but not its underlying substance (be-
longing-like assessments) which depends on deeply ingrained socio-psychological mechanisms. These two 
dimensions are expected to be affected by the crisis in different ways: the image being a more volatile re-
flection of historical circumstances, and the sense of belonging being more stable over time.  
We find that the Euro-crisis damaged the EU image especially in the countries most affected by the eco-
nomic downturn and among the unemployed, while declarations of ‘belonging’ remained relatively con-
stant. Contrary to what is frequently said, the core component of the European identity of EU citizens was 
largely unaffected by the Euro-crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On 12 October 2012, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In the 
media, where the image of the EU and its future were then dominated by gloom about 
the recession, this acknowledgment was received with some criticism and even deri-
sion. Many columnists highlighted that Europe was closer than ever to the sunset that 
is part of its founding Greek myth, in which Zeus in the form of a bull abducts a Phoeni-
cian princess, named Europa, and carries her westwards across the sea. Benign com-
mentators considered the Nobel Prize ‘a plea to support the endangered institution at 
a difficult hour’, as did The New York Times (Cowell and Kulish 2012). In fact, the media 
often lag behind reality. In October 2012 the spread of interest rates between EU 
member states’ sovereign bonds – possibly the best thermometer of the Euro-crisis – 
had already declined substantially from its all-time peaks. The Nobel Prize had no ef-
fect on financial recovery. Nevertheless, it reasserted a long-standing and higher-order 
value – peace, not bread-and-butter issues – as the core component of the EU’s mis-
sion and identity.  
Within European institutions, the concern to endow the EU (or its earlier incarna-
tions) with a values-plus-history based commonality – that is, a shared identity – has 
been in place for decades. Possibly, it was first brought to the fore on the occasion of 
the 1973 European Council, with the oil crisis in the background, and the hope that an 
official endorsement of the concept might lead to closer cooperation among the mem-
ber states (Stråth 2002). Thereafter, ‘identity technology’ (Kaina and Karolewski 2009) 
entered the agenda of EU policy-making. It inspired constitution-like legal documents 
(especially the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000, later to become part of the Lis-
bon Treaty of 2009) student exchange programs, and social science and humanities re-
search funding (Olsen 2012). In these documents the EU strove to gain a ‘moral order’ 
status more than did many European national states after World War II – even though 
some intellectuals would have preferred an even stronger commitment (e.g. Weiler 
2003). Overall, the EU has not refrained from marketing the values that it represents 
and its own symbols, seeking to forge a positive image and to create a stronger sense 
of belonging among citizens. 
The Euro-crisis affords an interesting occasion to assess the depth and persistence of 
European identity among Europeans. During the crisis, the dominant narratives of Eu-
rope became anchored in economic performances. The story from northern Europe 
depicted a continent torn between virtuous and overspending nations; the story from 
the south portrayed Europe as a Titanic with first and second class passenger-countries 
– the latter bearing the burden of technocratic and plutocratic diktats from the former. 
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Were the efforts of European identity-building made futile by the global recession that 
hit Europe from 2009 onwards? Was the collective bond of Europeans seriously threat-
ened by the crisis?  
The article starts by outlining our conceptualization and operationalization of Euro-
pean identity through standardized Eurobarometer (EB) questions. Then, given our dis-
tinction between ‘image’ and ‘belonging’ as separate dimensions of identity, we formu-
late three sets of hypotheses on changes in those dimensions in times of economic cri-
sis. Essentially, we argue that EU belonging is less volatile than the EU image, and that 
this difference is more marked in countries and among social categories more severely 
hit by the crisis. In the following section we test these hypotheses by comparing find-
ings from the Eurobarometers of 2004 and 2012. While our general argument on the 
higher stability of the ‘belonging’ dimension amid context-bound changes – like the Eu-
ro-crisis – holds, the concluding section discusses the relationship between these find-
ings and the growing popularity of anti-EU political parties. 
 
 
2. Image and Belonging: Unpacking European Identity 
 
Before examining European identity during the Euro-crisis, a more general question 
concerns the crisis of the identity concept itself. This culminated in the famous pro-
posal by Brubaker and Cooper (2000) to go ‘beyond identity’ – that is, to renounce the 
use of such an over-stretched concept. These authors drew a distinction between too 
strong and too weak understandings of identity conveying too much or too little mean-
ing. From this stems ‘a crisis of overproduction and consequent devaluation of mean-
ing’ of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 3). Furthermore, Brubaker and Cooper 
maintained that even when described in constructivist terms, the identity concept is 
essentialist in character. All this induced them to conclude that identity is not a useful 
category for social research. Whilst we sympathize with Brubaker’s and Cooper’s over-
all plea for analytical precision in the social sciences, and their contention that purely 
evocative use is often made of the term ‘identity’ (but much less so since their well-
argued and much-quoted tirade), we share the view that the concept can be profitably 
employed if it is properly operationalized (Greenfeld 1999, 38; Kaina 2013, 185). Specif-
ically in regard to European identity, Brubaker’s argument was echoed in Favell’s re-
mark that many enlist under this rubric what are ‘simply different possible ways of 
measuring knowledge of Europe, participation in Europe, opinions about Europe, per-
ceptions of Europe, etc.’ (Favell 2005, 1113). Accordingly, we would give away with the 
literature on ‘European identity’ that takes it as an underlying feature that can and 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(3) 2014: 509-531, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i3p509 
  
512 
 
must be ‘discovered’ as a hallmark of civilization (for a classification of the European 
identity literature, see Recchi 2014). Consequently, we do not deny the legitimacy of 
studies on ‘group level’ identities (Kaina 2012, 186-189), but as methodological indi-
vidualists we concentrate on the ‘individual level’.  
We maintain that sociological research on collective identity should elucidate two 
facets – ‘identity’ as external social representation (Moscovici 2000) and ‘identity’ as 
internal self-definition (Abrams and Hogg 2001). We call the two aspects, respectively, 
‘image’ and ‘belonging’. As ‘image’, the identity of X is the answer to the question: 
‘what is X?’ As ‘belonging’, it answers the question: ‘do I belong to X?’ The ‘image’ side 
of identity expresses a cognitive and evaluative orientation, while the ‘belonging’ side 
implies an affective orientation (Tajfel 1982).  
As we use it, the concept of ‘image’ refers to ‘the organized representation of an ob-
ject in an individual’s cognitive system’ (Kelman 1965, 24). The concept was explicitly 
employed by Hewstone (1986) in his pioneering analysis of attitudes to the European 
Community. In EU studies, it has been reprised in Mérand’s (2006) inquiry into the so-
cial representations of policy-makers in the field of EU security. ‘Belonging’ alludes to a 
feeling of inclusion within a super-individual entity – what social psychologists term 
‘the collective self [that] contains affiliations, group memberships, and connections to 
collectives of all types’ (Abrams and Hogg 2001, 432). This is what the empirical litera-
ture on European identity focuses on most frequently by adopting the instruments of 
public opinion research on nationalism (a most influential example is the collection by 
Herrmann et al. 2004).  
‘EU image’ and ‘EU belonging’ are not necessarily related. As has been shown, Afri-
cans single out the European Union as having certain characteristics, but they can hard-
ly say that they belong to it (Didelon et al. 2012). Europeans themselves may well elab-
orate a positive image of the EU without feeling any emotional attachment to it. Or, on 
the contrary, they may nurture a critical image of the EU but nonetheless have an emo-
tional bond with Europe. In general terms, our claim is that images are more volatile 
and malleable attitudes, whereas belongings reflect more solid and stable views. This 
challenges a widespread argument concerning the pernicious effects of the Euro-crisis. 
In academic research, Fligstein et al. (2012) outlined that national identifications grew 
in importance especially in the countries struggling with the crisis, shifting the focus 
from the EU to national governments as a solution to the global recession (see also 
Poliakova and Fligstein 2013). However, because collective identities are notoriously 
nested (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Marks and 
Hooghe 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004; Risse 2004; Bruter 2005; McLaren 2006), we sus-
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pect that the rise of national identification is not necessarily premised on a demise of 
European identification. 
We rely on Eurobarometer data to track shifts in ‘EU image’ and ‘EU belonging’ be-
fore and after the Euro-crisis erupted. In doing so, we follow an established literature 
on Europeans’ relations with the EU that mostly draws on Eurobarometer measure-
ments. Even though these measurements have changed over time, often responding to 
political concerns to boost pro-EU results, it is true that they offer researchers a not so 
common time-series of attitudes. Given the nature of these data, we will not describe 
the ‘EU image contents’ – that is, how people define or frame the European Union con-
ceptually. In this regard, in-depth interviews and focus group investigations are much 
more suitable. Indeed, they have produced quite substantial results – making clear the 
minimal salience of the EU for broad sections of the population (Duchesne et al. 2013; 
Gaxie et al. 2011; Meinhof 2004; White 2010) and the still robust influence of national 
discourses on the interpretation of the EU’s role and meaning (Díez Medrano 2003). 
We will restrict the analysis to whether people have a ‘positive’, ‘neutral’ or a ‘nega-
tive’ image of the EU,1 thus directly reflecting the changes in evaluative orientations 
that may have taken place from boom to bust.  
 
 
 
 
1
 The other limitation of our analysis of the EU image is that it does not include views of the EU from 
outside the EU’s borders. On this, however, there are three insightful studies. The first one, The External 
Image of the European Union project, explored the treatment of the EU in non-European media (Sperling 
2009). Among other things, it found that headlines from the Washington Post and the New York Times in 
the 1990s and early 2000s mentioned major member states more often than the EU. The image of the EU 
emerging from the headlines of these newspapers was that of a ‘security actor’. The second project on the 
perception of the EU from outside, the Eurobroadmap study (http://www.eurobroadmap.eu/), was carried 
out between 2009 and 2011. Eurobroadmap put imaginative questions – via mental maps and linguistic 
associations – about subjective visions of Europe to undergraduate students in 18 different countries 
across four continents. While the mental mapping of Europe did not differ dramatically, the vocabulary 
utilized to describe Europe proved to be extremely country-specific (Didelon et al. 2012). Finally, data from 
the PEW Global Attitudes Project (http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/) track substantial shifts 
in the EU’s image among Americans. Quite surprisingly, the recession in Europe at first coincided with a 
rise of positive opinions about the EU, which reached the peak of 59 per cent in 2010. When the economic 
situation in Europe deteriorated further, however, the share of positive opinions about Europe fell back to 
the level of 2007 (around 50 per cent). While almost three in ten Americans in 2007 did not want to ex-
press or (most likely) did not have an opinion about the EU, during the 2009-11 period, only one in five 
Americans refrained from doing so. This is perhaps an effect of higher coverage of EU issues in the Ameri-
can media, as opposed to the relative scarcity of news about the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
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3. Data and Hypotheses 
 
The two dimensions of EU identity on which we focus – EU image and EU belonging 
– are distinct but possibly interdependent (albeit not necessarily at the analytical level). 
If the former is very negative, we can hardly expect the latter to be very strong. Their 
relationship will be assessed in the empirical section of the article. However, our pri-
mary claim is that ‘images’ are more ephemeral perceptions, subject to events and 
media framings. Public opinion can rapidly change its ‘labelling’ of political institutions, 
for instance when office-holders change. In fact, we contend that ‘belongings’ tend to 
be more stable constructs. They are accrued by practices, sediment over time and have 
more to do with habitus (Dubar 1991, 67 ff.). Only extreme shocks can dissolve existing 
attachments – in our case, maybe the disruption of the EU itself or the exit of some 
member state.  
These theoretical premises induced us to formulate the following hypotheses for our 
analysis:  
 
H1. GENERAL TRENDS 
 
a) Both the EU image and EU belonging have weakened since before the Euro-crisis.  
b) The Euro-crisis has damaged the EU image more than EU belonging among Europe-
an citizens. 
 
H2. INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CHANGES 
 
a) The EU image has worsened especially among the social categories hit hardest by 
the crisis (the young, the less educated, the unemployed, the lower class). 
b) Different levels of EU belonging in different social categories persist over time. 
 
H3. COUNTRY-LEVEL CHANGES 
 
a) The EU image has worsened especially in the countries hit hardest by the crisis. 
b) EU belonging has declined especially in the countries hit hardest by the crisis, but 
to a lesser extent than the EU image. 
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We used trend data from the Eurobarometer interactive database2 and micro-data 
provided by ZACAT Eurobarometer 62.0 (2004), 64.2 (2005), 67.1 (2007), 73.4 (2010), 
76.4 (2011) and 77.3 (2012) to track changes in the EU image and EU belonging at the 
descriptive level. Inferential analysis was based on Eurobarometer 62.0 (2004) and 77.3 
(2012) micro-data, which enabled us to compare the trends at the time of economic 
prosperity (2004) and economic crisis (2012). 
To operationalize the EU image, we resorted to the following Eurobarometer ques-
tion: ‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly pos-
itive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’. Our analysis contrasts positive, 
negative and neutral (reference category) images. As for EU belonging, another Euro-
barometer question was examined: ‘In the near future do you see yourself as: national-
ity only/ nationality and European/European and nationality/ European only’.3 We con-
trast ‘strong’ European identifications (including European and nationality/ European 
only’) with all others.  
The set of predictors at the individual level included gender, age groups (reference: 
aged 55 or more), education (reference: finished education when 20 or older), occupa-
tional status (reference: not active in the labour market), type of community (refer-
ence: large town) and countries (reference: France). On the basis of the literature, we 
expected to find that people possessing more resources (highly educated and upper 
social strata), younger cohorts and individuals with better communication means with 
the rest of Europe (which is the case of those living in large towns) are more likely to 
feel attached to the EU. Moreover, we included EU image as a predictor of EU belong-
ing, anticipating that a positive image of the EU goes hand in hand with a stronger EU 
identification. Furthermore, we included country dummies as we predicted that in 
those member states particularly hit by the recession the EU image would be affected 
negatively and, to a lesser extent, EU belonging weakened.  
  
 
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm. 
3
 This is known as the ‘Moreno question’, after Luis Moreno Fernandez who first introduced it to inves-
tigate the rise of Scottish national identity and its relation with British identity. The question was then bor-
rowed by Eurobarometer to capture the interplay of national and European identifications. 
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Table 1. Trends in EU positive image (2004-2012), %  
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Table 2. Changes in ‘strong’ European belonging (including ‘European only’ and ‘European and national’, 2004-2012), % 
 
 Oct 04 Oct 05 Feb 07 May 10 Dec 11 May 12 
Austria 8 8 8 7 12 13 
Belgium 17 15 19 17 22 13 
Bulgaria 6 10 14 8 12 9 
Cyprus 11 11 15 14 19 12 
Czech 5 13 7 4 8 7 
Denmark 7 11 11 5 6 5 
Estonia 5 5 5 5 10 7 
Finland 3 3 5 7 6 6 
France 14 12 17 12 13 8 
Germany 14 14 18 13 17 10 
Greece 5 7 5 6 8 4 
Hungary 3 4 7 5 8 6 
Ireland 5 9 7 6 6 3 
Italy 13 8 9 9 13 14 
Latvia 7 3 6 12 14 12 
Lithuania 7 5 5 5 10 7 
Luxembourg 25 22 31 28 33 24 
Malta 9 5 4 5 5 5 
Netherlands 12 8 15 10 14 10 
Poland 4 6 6 7 8 4 
Portugal 3 4 8 8 10 5 
Romania 6 5 13 22 24 19 
Slovakia 13 9 12 13 15 12 
Slovenia 4 6 8 7 11 10 
Spain 10 10 12 12 15 10 
Sweden 6 6 6 6 10 4 
UK 7 3 7 4 7 5 
Total 10 9 12 10 13 9 
 
Source: Eurobarometers 62.0, 64.2, 67.1, 73.4, 76.4, 77.3 micro-data  
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4. Testing the Hypotheses 
 
H1a. Trends in EU image and EU belonging 
 
As expected, the image of the EU worsened in the 2004-12 period. Table 1 illustrates 
the downward shift in positive views of the EU across its member states. In 2004, Ro-
mania (a candidate country at the time) and Ireland ranked highest. In Bulgaria, anoth-
er candidate country, the pre-accession effect was clear as well. In Italy, Spain, Slove-
nia, and Luxembourg the share of positive views on the EU exceeded 60 per cent. The 
average for the EU as a whole hovered around 50 per cent. 
The situation changed quite remarkably in 2012. In all countries, the image of the EU 
deteriorated. The decline ranged between three per cent (Estonia) and 41 per cent 
(Spain). In Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Greece, the countries most affected by the 
economic downturn, the drop was most visible (not less than 30 per cent). The EU im-
age was least affected (less than a ten per cent fall) in Estonia, Poland, Denmark, Swe-
den, Bulgaria, and Malta. In 2012 Bulgaria and Romania were again the most Euro-
enthusiast countries (54 and 48 per cent of their citizens had a positive view of the Un-
ion, respectively). In Portugal and Spain, in fact, the proportion of respondents as-
sessing the EU positively halved compared to 2004. At the end of the period examined, 
the Czech Republic, Finland and the UK had the lowest proportions of people with posi-
tive views on the EU. However, the EU image was faring better than it did one year ear-
lier in many countries (France, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, Lithuania, the UK, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Slovakia). 
Overall, the image of the EU collapsed between the end of 2009 and mid-2012. But 
did this translate into a weaker attachment to Europe? Due to data availability, we ana-
lysed levels of EU belonging at six time points (Table 2).4 If we only compare 2004 and 
2012, the proportion of people strongly feeling themselves European (i.e. ‘European 
only’ and ‘European-and-national’) was about the same: approximately ten per cent. In 
the period examined, about half of the countries recorded a drop in numbers of people 
with a ‘strong’ EU belonging. Interestingly, however, these were not residents of the 
countries hit most by the economic crisis, but rather of some of the EU founding mem-
ber states, i.e. France, Germany and Belgium. On the other hand, levels of EU belong-
ing rose despite the recession in some of the new EU member states. Romania record-
ed a remarkable 12 per cent increase of 'strong' Europeans. There were smaller in-
 
4
 Answer categories ‘don’t know’, ‘none (spontaneous)’, ‘refusal (spontaneous)’ were excluded from 
analysis. 
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creases in Slovenia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Austria, Finland, and, surprisingly, 
Portugal, had more respondents declaring an exclusive attachment to Europe in 2012, 
although they declined markedly in a shorter term perspective.  
Closer inspection of trends in time shows that the amount of people declaring them-
selves ‘European only’ grew in 2007 (compared to 2005), while it tended to oscillate 
during the Euro-crisis years. However, in 2011 – right in the middle of the crisis – it 
reached an all-time high in many countries. These figures diminished in 2012, reverting 
to the mean of the 2000s. 
In parallel, it is useful to track changes in ‘exclusive’ national identifications between 
2004 and 2012 (table 3). In this time span, 2010 was quite exceptional, because for the 
first time since 1999 people declaring that they felt ‘national only’ outnumbered those 
who mentioned some European belonging (Fligstein et al. 2012). The 2010 peak, how-
ever, was not confirmed. The following years saw an increase in the Eurobarometer re-
spondents who declared that they felt attached to both their nation and Europe. In 
2012 more than half of the entire EU sample stated that they saw themselves as both 
nationals and Europeans (table 4).  
What happened in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and Spain during the Euro-
crisis warrants additional attention. For residents of Ireland and Cyprus, the crisis was 
accompanied by a rise in ‘exclusively national’ identifications, whilst ‘national and Eu-
ropean’ belongings dropped. Yet in Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy the opposite oc-
curred: ‘exclusively national’ identifications decreased whilst ‘national and European’ 
identifications became more popular. The decline of strong national belonging was par-
ticularly marked in Italy: from 48 per cent in May 2010 to 30 per cent in December 
2011. This fed into a robust rise in the proportion of individuals defining themselves as 
‘national and European’ (from 43 to 58 per cent). Similarly, Hungary, Luxembourg, Fin-
land, Poland and Sweden recorded an over ten per cent dip in the number of people 
reporting that they felt ‘national only’ and a growth in the ‘national and European’ 
sense of attachment. In Romania there was some polarization: weak European belong-
ing (‘national and European’) dropped, while growing numbers of respondents de-
clared a 'strong' attachment to Europe (‘European and national’ and ‘European only’) 
as well as a ‘national only’ attachment. 
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Table 3. Changes in ‘national only’ identification in EU member states (2004-2012), % 
 
 Oct 04 Oct 05 Feb 07 May 10 Dec 11 May 12 
Austria 43 46 45 49 45 42 
Belgium 31 35 30 35 28 30 
Bulgaria 42 45 47 54 45 47 
Cyprus 28 31 39 40 40 40 
Czech 57 38 49 59 55 50 
Denmark 40 40 37 43 41 40 
Estonia 44 51 48 50 46 48 
Finland 56 49 49 48 47 45 
France 31 33 32 43 38 36 
Germany 37 36 31 39 31 33 
Greece 57 47 49 51 55 45 
Hungary 65 51 46 48 51 46 
Ireland 41 49 59 60 60 54 
Italy 36 38 54 48 30 34 
Latvia 47 46 56 54 51 49 
Lithuania 55 55 57 62 52 57 
Luxembourg 33 26 23 24 22 20 
Malta 36 29 35 38 32 36 
Netherlands 33 34 29 37 33 33 
Poland 46 40 45 44 42 35 
Portugal 50 44 50 44 48 37 
Romania 41 40 55 57 48 45 
Slovakia 38 39 44 42 32 32 
Slovenia 44 36 36 56 38 40 
Spain 40 38 35 36 31 34 
Sweden 48 44 46 49 39 38 
UK 57 65 61 72 62 61 
Total 42 42 43 48 40 40 
 
Source: Eurobarometers 62.0, 64.2, 67.1, 73.4, 76.4, 77.3 micro-data 
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Table 4. Changes in ‘national and European’ identification in EU member states (2004-2012), % 
 
 Oct 04 Oct 05 Feb 07 May 10 Dec 11 May 12 
Austria 49 46 47 43 42 45 
Belgium 51 50 51 49 49 57 
Bulgaria 52 45 39 38 43 44 
Cyprus 61 58 46 45 40 48 
Czech 37 49 43 36 37 43 
Denmark 53 50 53 52 52 55 
Estonia 51 44 47 45 44 45 
Finland 41 48 47 45 47 49 
France 56 55 51 44 49 56 
Germany 49 50 51 48 52 57 
Greece 37 46 46 42 36 51 
Hungary 32 45 47 47 41 48 
Ireland 54 42 34 35 34 43 
Italy 51 54 36 43 58 51 
Latvia 46 51 38 34 35 39 
Lithuania 38 40 38 32 38 36 
Luxembourg 42 52 46 48 44 56 
Malta 55 67 61 57 64 59 
Netherlands 54 58 56 53 53 57 
Poland 50 54 49 48 50 61 
Portugal 47 52 42 48 42 57 
Romania 52 55 32 21 28 36 
Slovakia 49 52 44 46 53 56 
Slovenia 52 58 55 37 51 50 
Spain 50 51 53 52 54 56 
Sweden 45 51 48 45 51 58 
UK 36 32 31 24 31 33 
Total 48 49 45 42 47 51 
 
Source: Eurobarometers 62.0, 64.2, 67.1, 73.4, 76.4, 77.3 micro-data 
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H1b. Comparison of the above-mentioned trends 
 
The investigation of trends in the EU image and belonging suggests that the image 
component of EU identity is more sensitive to business cycles than is the belonging 
component. This is in line with the hypothesis. The trend was even stronger than ex-
pected, since the levels of EU belonging grew as the crisis proceeded, to shift back in 
2012 to the levels of 2004-05. 
 
H2a. Individual-level changes in the EU’s image between 2004 and 2012 
 
What social categories have a more positive image of the EU? And, more important-
ly, does the deterioration of the EU’s image concentrate in some social groups as hy-
pothesized? Multinomial logistic regression models were run to compare the determi-
nants of the EU image in 2004 and 2012 (table 5). The dependent variable had three 
categories: positive, negative and neutral (base category) image.  
Models 1 and 2 focus on individual determinants of having a positive EU image in 
2004 and 2012 respectively. The overall picture reflects the findings of previous resear-
ch: the EU enjoys a better image among men, the highly educated, upper classes, and 
city-dwellers. But what is especially of interest here are changes from 2004 to 2012, 
which we will interpret bearing in mind the caveats highlighted by Mood (2010). These 
are broadly in line with our expectation. Most noticeably, the unemployed became less 
likely to express positive and neutral views of the EU. Their explicit inclination to have a 
negative image became significant in the 2012 model, as predicted. Analogously, the 
less educated became most negative about the EU with the crisis. Finally, contrary to 
what was expected, the EU image of people from their mid-20s to late 30s has not 
dramatically worsened, even though young people have been particularly hard hit by 
the reduction of occupational opportunities in many member states.5 
 
H2b. Individual-level changes in EU belonging between 2004 and 2012 
 
Whereas we hypothesized that the EU image may be susceptible to economic 
shocks, we expected to find that EU belonging is comparatively more stable and resili-
 
5
 Eurostat reports that youth unemployment declined from 2004 (19 per cent) to 2008 (15 per cent), but then 
escalated constantly up to 23 per cent in 2012. The corresponding figures for the whole working-age population are 
9 per cent in 2004, 7 per cent in 2008 and almost 11 per cent in 2012: 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics (consulted 20 July 
2013). 
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ent to changes in the business cycle (table 6). Models 3 and 4 concern the individual 
level determinants of EU belonging in 2004 and 2012. In line with the literature, we 
found that males, the highly educated, upper class respondents, and residents of large 
towns are significantly more likely to feel European. As predicted, these effects are 
highly persistent over time. In fact, younger cohorts’ sense of belonging to the EU be-
came significant only in 2012. The comparison between the 2004-12 changes in EU im-
age and EU belonging among younger cohorts shows that while the younger cohorts 
are no longer more neutral than positive about the EU image, their sense of belonging 
to the EU consolidated, ceteris paribus. Finally, these models clarify the empirical rela-
tion between EU image and EU belonging. In both samples, a positive image resonates 
with a strong sense of belonging. The opposite does not hold, however. The association 
between a negative EU image and a feeble sense of belonging was significant in 2012, 
while this was not the case in 2004. It is likely that the Euro-crisis has determined an 
alignment of the cognitive/evaluative and affective components of European identity. 
 
H3a. Country-level changes in EU image between 2004 and 2012 
 
As expected, residents of countries particularly hit by the crisis (Ireland, Greece, Ita-
ly, Portugal, Spain) turned to see the EU in less positive light in 2012 than eight years 
earlier. In 2004, residents of all these countries were more likely to hold neutral views 
about the EU than negative ones. These effects became insignificant (Ireland, Italy, Por-
tugal, Spain) or reversed (Greece) in 2012.  
Respondents in other countries shifted in the same direction: in Belgium, Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Hungary they were more prone to hold neutral than negative im-
age of the EU in 2004, but this was not the case (or the effect was not significant any 
more) in any of these countries in 2012. Compared to French residents, residents of 
the ‘new’ EU member states generally tend to be more neutral than negative even in 
2012, with the notable exceptions of Hungarians, Czechs, and Cypriots (the latter more 
likely to have negative image of the EU). 
 
H3b. Country-level changes in EU belonging between 2004 and 2012 
 
With models 3 and 4 we analyse the impact of country dummies on EU belonging in 
2004 and 2012 respectively. As expected, EU belonging is not as negatively affected as 
the image of the EU during the crisis. We can distinguish two situations. The first one is 
prevalent in most new EU member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Slovenia) and Portugal, where people were significantly less likely to feel European in 
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2004, but no more in 2012. The second situation is typical of countries experiencing 
very difficult economic times (Cyprus, Italy, Spain, and Romania), as well as Belgium 
and Austria, where the likelihood of having a sense of EU belonging became significant-
ly stronger.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Euro-crisis tainted the image of the EU both on a global scale and Europe-wide. 
Within the EU, the social representation of the Union suffered especially in the coun-
tries most affected by the economic downturn: Ireland, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal 
and Spain. Our hypothesis, however, was that ‘image’ is the more volatile component 
of identity, grounded in cognitive/evaluative orientations. Collective identity has its 
deep-seated and affective root in a ‘sense of belonging’. ‘Images’ are transient judg-
ments of contingencies, while ‘belongings’ are self-understandings that connect the 
self with a broader social organization. Therefore, we expected that the Euro-crisis wo-
uld erode the positive image of the EU but not the feeling of ‘being European’ among 
European citizens. Indeed, the proportion of the population describing themselves as 
primarily ‘European’ remained relatively stable over the years, and only small shifts 
were recorded in the majority of countries. Contrary to what is frequently heard and 
said in the public discourse, this dimension of EU identity was largely unaffected by the 
vagaries of the economic climate. This finding is in line with those of previous analyses 
attesting to a limited and declining impact of macroeconomic factors on Europeans’ 
support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). 
The examination of the social determinants of EU image and EU belonging was car-
ried out to test whether the lighter side of identity (i.e. image) was particularly shaken 
across the weakest groups, while the more solid side (i.e., belonging) could resist even 
among those groups. These expectations were generally confirmed by the data. Com-
pared to 2004, the social determinants of the EU image weakened in 2012, as if the 
economic situation ‘democratized’ discontent and made the EU image less anchored to 
established supporters. In fact, the predictors of a higher sense of EU belonging sho-
wed a remarkable continuity over time, as expected.  
At the country level, the findings are entirely in line with the hypothesis: the image 
of the EU worsened in the most indebted countries, but EU belonging levels did not. 
This corroborates our main theoretical tenet: economic and political downturns can al-
ter the external layer of identity (image-like assessments), but not its core substance, 
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which depends on more deeply ingrained socio-psychological mechanisms. People do 
not suddenly change their self-definitions, not even at times of deep uncertainty. 
One message of this article is that, in spite of its socioeconomic and political after-
maths, the Euro-crisis was not an identitarian Armageddon. However, there is a caveat: 
Eurobarometer data do not provide a measure of the subjective salience of identifica-
tions – that is, ‘the likelihood that a given identity will be active across situations’ (Mor-
ris 2013, 24; see also Stryker and Serpe 1994). And salience is dramatically important 
when it comes to translating identities into behaviours. While they are not necessarily 
acted upon, collective identities constitute a repertoire open to mobilization by ‘politi-
cal entrepreneurs’. What the Euro-crisis possibly did, in fact, was to enhance the politi-
cal salience of national identities, capitalizing on nationalism’s power as a simplifying 
ideology that tends to be evoked in the face of complex hardships (Gingrich and Banks 
2006). Hence, even if their number has not been expanding, Europeans with an over-
whelming sense of national belonging have increasingly rallied under neo-nationalist 
and anti-EU party banners – as the results of the European Parliament elections of May 
2014 attested especially in France, Great Britain and Denmark. The national versus Eu-
ropean identity antagonism is the feature shared by the Front National, UK Independ-
ence Party and Dansk Folkeparti – just to mention the three most successful neo-
nationalist parties in the EU. While their impact is certainly magnified by the feeble sa-
lience that mars European identity among the silent majority of European citizens (Bel-
lucci, Sanders and Serricchio 2012; Van Ingelgom 2014), our analysis may suggest that 
their potential for further electoral expansion is constrained by the size of the EU popu-
lation that does not see itself as part of a collective European destiny. In spite of the 
crisis, this remains a minority.  
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Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression models of EU image (positive, negative vs. neutral), 2004 and 2012 
 
 
 
Sources: Eurobarometer 62 (2004) and 77.3 (2012). N (2004)= 23,118; N (2011)= 23,641. Pseudo R2= .0664 (model 1), 
.0455 (model 2). Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Class I= business owners, top managers, professionals, II= 
middle managers, employed professionals, III= service and white–collar workers, IV= shop owners, crafts persons, self-
employed manual workers, V-VI-VII= employed manual workers.  
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Table 6. Binomial logistic regression models of EU belonging (European only/European and national vs. national on-
ly/national and European), 2004 and 2012 
 
 
 
Sources: Eurobarometer 62 (2004) and 77.3 (2012). N (2004)= 11,511; N (2012)= 22,928. Pseudo R2: .087 (2004), .074 
(2012).  Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Class I= business owners, top managers, professionals, II= middle 
managers, employed professionals, III= service and white–collar workers, IV= shop owners, crafts persons, self-
employed manual workers, V-VI-VII= employed manual workers. 
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